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I. Introduction
How is a discipline built? More specifically, how does a scholarly
movement based on the interdisciplinary study of law build and share
knowledge and yet retain an identity of its own? 
In The Handbook of Law and Society, editors Austin Sarat and Patricia
Ewick have collected twenty-eight essays to describe the elephant we
know as the “Law and Society movement.” Published fifty years after the
creation of the Law and Society Association (LSA) in 1964, the Handbook
looks back, marks the “emerging maturity” of the movement, and forecasts
its future.1 Unlike the elephant being described by blind observers who
touch only its front or its back, the Law and Society movement is captured
here by editors and authors familiar with its whole, present and past.
As the Handbook describes it, the movement became a collective
body whose work could be assessed through the conferences, workshops,
and other activities of the LSA and the articles published in the Law &
Society Review. Initially, the movement brought together sociologists and
law professors who described their purposes neutrally, as academic rather
than political. The goal of the LSA, according to its first president, was to
bring about “more rigorous and formal interdisciplinary training” in law
* Linda Berger is Family Foundation Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Faculty Development and Research at UNLV
Boyd School of Law. Thank you to Nantiya Ruan for thoughtful guidance.
1 Patricia Ewick & Austin Sarat, On the Emerging Maturity of Law and Society: An Introduction, in THE HANDBOOK OF LAW
AND SOCIETY i, xiii (Patricia Ewick & Austin Sarat eds., 2015) (hereinafter “HANDBOOK”).
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and sociology.2 The purpose of the Review was to respond to “a growing
need on the part of social scientists and lawyers for a forum in which to
carry on an interdisciplinary dialogue.”3
Similar to the LSA, the Legal Writing Institute was established (in
1984) to foster teaching and scholarship in order to improve legal commu-
nication. Like the Review, the disciplinary journals in our field4 responded
to the need to build and disseminate the discipline’s knowledge base.
Hearing echoes in these origin stories, I read the Handbook with a specific
purpose in mind: How might the evolution of these related and relatively
new scholarly fields inform one another? 
II. The Founding of  an Interdisciplinary Movement
Lawrence Friedman, one of its early leaders, summarized the Law and
Society movement’s first principles as follows: 
[It] describe[s] the efforts of sociologists of law, anthropologists of law,
political scientists who study judicial behavior, historians who explore
the role of nineteenth-century lawyers, psychologists who ask why juries
behave as they do . . . . What they share is a general commitment to
approach law with a vision and with methods that come from outside the
discipline itself; and they share a commitment to explain legal
phenomena . . . in terms of their social setting.5
Another long-time leader depicted the movement as having built
consensus around the “widely shared view that law and society work was
synonymous with law and social science with a gentle reformist edge often
added.”6
As its target for study, the Law and Society movement would take on
the difference between the “law on the books” and the “law in action.”7
This distinction had been recognized early in the 20th century, when, for
example, “a few law professors at the University of Wisconsin, rather than
honoring common law doctrine, [began to study] the law in action.”8 Near
2 G. Edward White, From Realism to Critical Legal Studies: A Truncated Intellectual History, 40 SW. L.J. 819, 830–31 (1986)
(quoting Richard B. Yegge, The Law and Society Association to Date, 1 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 3, 4 (1966)).
3 Richard D. Schwartz, From the Editor, 1 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 6, 6 (1966).
4 LEGAL WRITING founded in 1991, and LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD, founded in 2002.
5 Lawrence W. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763, 763 (1986).
6 Austin Sarat, Vitality Amidst Fragmentation: On the Emergence of Postrealist Law and Society Scholarship, in THE
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 1, 8, (Austin Sarat ed., 2004).
7 White, supra note 2, at 830–31.
8 Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: “Things Ain’t What They Used to Be,” 2005 WIS. L. REV. 365, 367. 
the same time, Eugen Ehrlich, an Austrian legal scholar known as one of
the founders of the sociology of the law,9 formulated the concept of “the
living law”: 
The living law is that law which is not imprisoned in rules of law, but
which dominates life itself. The sources of its knowledge are above all the
modern documents, and also immediate study of life itself, of commerce,
of customs and usage, and of all sorts of organizations, including those
which are recognized by the law, and, indeed, those which are disap-
proved by the law.10
Early Law and Society scholars recognized that context, and especially
the beliefs and values of those in power, affects the meaning of legal rules:
“The laws of China, the United States, Nazi Germany, France, and the
Union of South Africa reflect the goals and policies of those who call the
tune in those societies.”11 When the powerful change, the law changes.
The significance of governmental and societal context led Friedman to
conclude that “the strongest ingredient in American law, at any given time,
is the present: current emotions, real economic interests, concrete
political groups.”12
Over the years, Law and Society scholarship became mainstream:
“Interdisciplinary research is now the norm at elite schools; ‘law and’
continues to be the rage.” Law faculties included social scientists, and even
traditional scholars dipped into other disciplines. Ironically, this “domesti-
cation” of the movement included “the great success of a discipline not
originally included in the cluster of social sciences identified by the Law
and Society Association at its formation: economics.”13
III. The Evolution of an Interdisciplinary Field
The impetus for the Law and Society movement was to understand
the social context within which the law worked and to seek scientific
backing for improved policy prescriptions. In its second era, the field
moved to a richer understanding of the ways in which law and society
construct one another. The third era, as described in the Handbook,
9 EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1936).
10 Macaulay, supra note 8, at 367–68 (quoting William H. Page, Professor Ehrlich’s Czernowitz Seminar of Living Law,
reprinted in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 825 (Jerome Hall ed., 1938)).
11 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 18 (2d ed. 1985).
12 FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 19. 
13 White, supra note 2, at 840.
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appears to carry the potential to be both more expansive, in moving to
transnational contexts and regions, and more limited, in moving away
from methodological pluralism to convergence on particular qualitative
techniques.
According to one of its “origin stories,” LSA was founded when a
group of legal realists challenging legal formalism joined a small group of
sociologist defectors from the American Sociological Association.14
Emerging during the “last stages of the social activist state,”15 as the federal
government entered many new areas of society, these scholars decided
that social science was needed to produce a kind of “new knowledge about
law that was neither doctrinal nor purely theoretical.” The movement had
concrete results. First, it changed legal education because “[i]t helped
complete the realist shift of law-school textbooks from cases to materials
and notes.” Second, it affected the workings of the judicial system because
“[i]t achieved recognition in the law through the creation of significant
social science functions within the court system.” And finally, it affected
public discussion of the law because the movement’s “research concerning
the structural failures of the legal system have become endemic to public
discourse including the social pathologies of litigation, the failure of regu-
lators to reproduce law, and the weakness of the criminal sanction.”16
The recognized effects of social science on the law can be traced back
as least as far as the first of the Brandeis briefs, and these effects became
more pronounced in the 1960s Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl
Warren. Under Chief Justice Warren, a series of “[h]ighly publicized
rulings on issues like school desegregation, voting rights, and religious
freedom made constitutional law synonymous with hot-button social
issues.” Criminal-justice decisions were particularly affected. Landmark
rulings “drew on sociolegal knowledge, both by direct citation and,
perhaps more important, by borrowing the sociological vision of legal
institutions in rationalizing its decisions.”17
As for the effects on the discipline itself, the Handbook editors
conclude that Law and Society research constructed a more complex and
nuanced understanding of law’s interrelationships and interactions with
society. Three “eras” in the development of the law and society canon are
sketched in the Handbook.18 In the first era, “law in context,” scholars
14 Bryant Garth & Joyce Sterling, From Legal Realism to
Law and Society: Reshaping Law for the Last Stages of the
Social Activist State, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 409, 409–10
(1998). 
15 Id. at 409. 
16 Jonathan Simon, Law After Society, 24 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 143, 144 (1999) (reviewing LAW AND SOCIETY:
READINGS ON THE SOCIAL STUDY OF LAW (Stewart
Macaulay et al., eds., 1995)).
17 Id. at 168.
18 See Ewick & Sarat, supra note 1, at xvi–xxi, and Calvin
Morrill & Kelsey Mayo, Charting the “Classics” in Law and
Society: The Development of the Field over the Past Half-
Century, in HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 18–36 (describing
this evolution).
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examined the ways in which the law is shaped by context. This stage relied
on the assumption that the law was distinct from society and that Law and
Society scholars would use what they learned to pursue liberal reforms.19
The second era, a more critical stage, was dubbed the “decentering
era.” In this era, Law and Society scholars recognized that “law and society
are constituted by one another.”20 Rather than focus on what the law does
and on formal legal institutions, as the first era was said to do, scholars
paid attention in the decentering era to what the law means and on
everyday settings.21
The current, very fluid, era is said to be a “global” one in which
scholars concentrate their study on moving across or beyond legal
concepts hemmed in by traditional and national boundaries. This shift
grows out of the mutually constitutive theory of Law and Society and pays
“analytic attention to processes rather than to entities, to engagements
rather than encounters, to networks rather than actors.”22 In more-
concrete terms, what does this shift mean? According to the editors, it
means that Law and Society researchers are posing questions such as how
to delineate what is legal when the world no longer recognizes the national
boundaries that historically defined the law, rights, and citizenship, or how
to investigate whether there are universal human rights in a world marked
by diverse local cultures and multiple and alternative forms of
personhood.23
IV. Models and Lessons 
Among the remarkable facets of the Law and Society movement is its
self-reflectiveness and its relatively rigorous self-critique. A 2014 project
aimed at gathering a selective sample to mark LSA’s 50th anniversary
yielded seventy-three publications reviewing, reflecting on, or critiquing
the field. According to editors Ewick and Sarat, the movement’s evolution
has been marked not by a series of paradigm shifts, but instead by a
“process of expansion, diversification and accretion.” In the words of
another scholar, the movement has accumulated “an ongoing sedimented
canon.”24
The editors argue that although this evolution has sometimes created
the perception “that the field is boundaryless and incoherent,” the actual
result has been to establish enough space for “intellectual creativity, flexi-
19 Morrill & Mayo, supra note 18, at 19–23.
20 Id. at 23.
21 Id. at 23–27.
22 Id. at 27–29.
23 Ewick & Sarat, supra note 1, at xix.
24 Id. at xiv.
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bility and innovation.”25 For innovation to flourish, the editors suggest,
disciplinary perspectives must do more than clash or be placed in “juxta-
position.” Instead, different perspectives must become a “kind of
aggregation and accumulation of new questions.” Thus, rather than the
logical building up from the ground of a foundation of knowledge, Law
and Society has gone through “a process of serial appropriation and re-
contextualization.”26 For example, Law and Society scholars borrowed
concepts from narrative theory and analysis, and then they studied how
stories work in legal settings. In response, some Law and Society scholars
moved away from strictly literary concepts to more expansive studies of
human activities and discourses. Such back-and-forth processes of
borrowing “ended up producing a rich body of research about narrative as
something that occurs in social interaction and about social interaction as
something that is constituted by narrative.”27
For those interested in discerning and describing the process of disci-
plinary knowledge building, the Handbook offers rich exemplars,
especially the foundational chapter 2, which takes a carefully nuanced
approach to identifying the Law and Society “canon.”28 Similarly, in the
chapter called Mapping a Cultural Studies of Law, Naomi Mezey sets forth
an impressive analysis that results from “map[ping] the terrain of a set of
scholarly approaches that could be called a cultural analysis of law.”29
Cultural analyses borrow from “cultural and literary theory, anthropology,
history, sociology, and philosophy,” and they take as their “object of study a
set of cultural practices.”30 Mezey sets out three “routes” that have been
effectively traversed by cultural-studies scholars: narration, identity, and
visuality. 31
In the chapter on The Constitution of Identity: Law and Race, Osagie
Obasogie explores the benefits of the blended form of scholarship that, as
the editors suggested, moves beyond the juxtaposition of clashing disci-
plines to the aggregation and accumulation of new questions. His model,
he explains, “attempts to transcend the field’s limited perspective on race
by developing methodological approaches that blend empirical methods
with critical race theory.” Obasogie describes his use of qualitative
methods to ask how blind people understand race, followed by his use of
25 Id. at xiv–xv.
26 Id. at xv.
27 Id. at xvi.
28 Morrill & Mayo, supra note 18.
29 Naomi Mezey, Mapping a Cultural Studies of Law, in HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 39.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 43–53.
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the resulting data to criticize law and public policies that are based on the
assumption that race matters because it is visually apparent. Obasogie’s
chapter provides useful models of critical review of the movement’s schol-
arship as well. 32
Other chapters in the Handbook might serve as models for delving
into a series of questions that are as fundamental for the discipline of legal
communication as they are for the Law and Society movement: what is
“law,” how do we determine what law means, what should we study when
we study law, and how do we do things with law? In Domains of Policy:
Law and Society Research on the Family, Annie Bunting explains ways in
which socio-legal authors approach family-law study, often beginning with
the destabilizing question aimed at upsetting preconceptions: what
constitutes a family, a parent, a childhood, a spouse?33 In the chapter on
antidiscrimination law, Donna Young espouses a comparative view to
overcome the limitations of the U.S. approach to equality and antidiscrim-
ination.34 In the chapter on immigration law, Leisy Abrego examines
immigrants’ lived experiences and points out that because immigrants do
not fit neatly into the binary language categories of “documented” or
“undocumented,” both real-life consequences and enforcement practices
may vary in unexpected ways. 35
V. Curious Omissions and “Law as”
Indexing is an inexact guide to coverage. But I found myself
wondering why the index for the Handbook contained no entries for
topics, theories, methods, and disciplines that I find central to the study of
what law is, how we understand law’s meaning, and how law works. There
were, for example, no entries for rhetoric, metaphor, narrative, language,
or discourse.36
Based only on the Handbook, today’s Law and Society movement
appears to pay scant attention to the humanistic discipline of rhetoric.
This appearance may inaccurately reflect the movement in action.
Marianne Constable, a Professor of Rhetoric at Berkeley, is, for example, a
32 Osagie K. Obasogie, The Constitution of Identity: Law and Race, in HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 339–49.
33 Annie Bunting, Domains of Policy: Law and Society Research on the Family, in HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 199–209.
34 Donna E. Young, Domains of Policy: Law and Society Perspectives on Antidiscrimination Law, in HANDBOOK, supra note
1, at 212–26.
35 Leisy J. Abrego, Immigration Law and Immigrants’ Lived Experiences, in HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 258–71.
36 There are entries for “narration—see also cultural studies of law” and “language and culture of law.” Although interpretive
practices and language discussions occur throughout the Handbook, their omission from the index indicates that these are
not seen as central to the theory or methods of the movement. 
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leading Law and Society scholar.37 Early in the Handbook, the editors
describe the movement’s spread as now encompassing “all species of social
science disciplines, as well as several humanistic fields,” and they write that
the original concentration on empirical study “has [been] enlarged to
include interpretive and hermeneutic analysis of texts and culture.”38
What would be the loss if rhetoric and its siblings fail to engage the
law and society movement in action? By rhetoric, I mean the study and
practice that center on the effects of our use of language and symbols to
communicate. In particular, I mean rhetoric as “the art of thought called
for where scientific or mathematical forms of thought won’t work, where
we live in necessary uncertainty?”39 The value of bringing rhetoric into
conversations about law and society—that is, the reason for studying what
happens when individual human beings use particular words and images
to communicate with particular audiences in particular situations—is that
rhetorical practice accommodates “law in context,” “law as” constitutive of
community, and the destabilization of established boundaries, the evolu-
tionary eras described in the Handbook. 
Like most “law &” scholarship, the scholarship of “law as rhetoric”
relies on bringing the vantage point of an “other” discipline to the
researcher’s understanding, exploration, and criticism of the law. For law
as rhetoric, this agreed starting point encompasses not only the insight
that human imagination begins by “making the familiar strange”40 but also
the belief that human thought becomes wider and deeper by engaging in
dialogic argument. What we assume to be natural and inevitable can
become the subject of study only when we view it from another
perspective, or from the outside in and the inside out.41 Such de-familiar-
ization occurs when, for example, we look at the law and its contexts
(including its subjects and its protagonists) from the standpoint of other
disciplines or from the perspective of travelers from other regions. 
For example, take the dialogic rhetoric discussed by Michael Billig in
Arguing as Thinking.42 Billig conceives of human thinking as funda-
37 See Marianne Constable at http://rhetoric.berkeley.edu/faculty-profile/marianne-constable-1.
38 Ewick & Sarat, supra note 1, at ix. 
39 James Boyd White, A Symposium: The Theology of the Practice of Law, February 14, 2002 Roundtable Discussion, 53
MERCER L. REV. 1087, 1089 (2002). 
40 See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 14 (2002). It is evident that Law and Society
scholars recognize this. For example, in the chapter on Definitional Disputes, Susan Sterett explores the tension between
viewing law as authority and law as field and points out that feminist and critical-race scholars have shown that things look
different from different standpoints. Susan M. Sterett, What is Law and Society?: Definitional Disputes, in HANDBOOK, supra
note 1, at 3, 4–5.
41 This concept comes from bell hooks, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER, at preface (1984). 
42 MICHAEL BILLIG, ARGUING AND THINKING: A RHETORICAL APPROACH TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (2d ed. 1996). 
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mentally argumentative, or two-sided: “Humans do not converse because
they have inner thoughts to express, but they have thoughts to express
because they converse.” Dialogue offers the power to open up thinking by
providing an argumentative heuristic that moves through recursive rounds
of discussion, justification and criticism, always considering the argumen-
tative context (or, in other words, taking into account not only what is said,
but also what is being argued against).
In the end, without explicit mention of rhetorical theory or analysis,
the Handbook echoes the arguments of rhetoricians when it discusses the
value of its new vision of interdisciplinarity: “[D]isciplines [should be used
to] correct each other’s absurdities. The more we confront others’ ways of
knowing, the more we confront the deficiencies in our own.”43 And again,
as Osagie Obasogie writes, the goal of bringing together the strengths of
one discipline with the methods of another is not to supplement one or to
defend the other, but instead “the goal is for an interpenetrative
engagement that encourages new ways to think about and measure race
[and other issues] so as to effectively capture and respond to the many
racial [and other] challenges that we face . . . .”44
Conversation, confrontation, engagement. Perhaps this is how these
related fields might eventually begin to inform one another, through the
conversation, confrontation, and engagement that encourage both fields to
discover new ways to think and respond to the issues and challenges we all
face.
43 Ewick & Sarat, supra note 1, at xv. 
44 Id. at 348.
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